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MEXICAN OPTIMISM AND ECONOM,IC REALITY: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
MEXICAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 
by 
ROBERT E. LOONEY(*) 
Abstract 
The publication of the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Industrial in 
March 1979 clarified and structured Mexico's oil-based development stra-
tegy. The initial reaction to the industrial plan was gen,erally good in 
business circles because it helped to reduce uncertainty about the future, 
but the industrial strategy has been questioned by different groups because 
of the overall ideological orientation and role of the government in the 
economy espoused by each. A more fundamental criticism of the plan can 
be raised, however, from a purely technical point of view. As the paper 
demonstrates, th( plan is weak in its identification of several key economic 
relationships, makes unrealistic assumptions about certain exogenous 
factors and could be considerably improved upon at little cost or loss of 
goal attainment simply through rescheduling of several of its key expen-
diture streams. 
Introduction 
Former President Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) described Mexico's 
oil based industrialization strategy as representing the country's :first 
genuine opportunity to establish an independent model of economic deve-
lopment. The publication of the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Industrial 
in March 1979 clarified the nature of this model; the debate around the 
(*) Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. 
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plan immediately following its introduction also threw more light on 
the fundamental policy choices that had been made by the government 
and that the authorities felt at the time would determine the socio-
economic course of Mexico until the end of the century (1). 
The plan represents the determination of the Mexican government 
to overcome the structural problems of the economy by applying its oil 
resources to public and private investment in heavy industry and manu-
facturing exports. Incentives are geared to reducing regional imbalances, 
providing employment (through the decentralization of plants and the 
support of small business), and expanding capacity. The participation of 
foreign firms is encouraged in branches involved in technology transfers 
and exports. 
The initial reaction to the industrial plan was generally good in 
business circles because it helped to reduce uncertainty about the future, 
but the industrial strategy has been questioned by different groups 
because of the overall ideological orientation and role of the government 
in the economy espoused by each. A more fundamental criticism of the 
plan can be raised,' however, from a purely technical point of view. As 
the following sections demonstrate, the plan is weak in its identification of 
several key economic relationships, makes unrealistic assumptions about 
certain exogenous factors, and could be considerably improved upon at 
little cost or loss of goal attainment simply through a rescheduling of 
several of its key expenditure streams c~). These facts have been borne 
out by the recent (February 1982) devaluation, mounting government 
deficits, and austerity program introduced by the government. A critique 
of the plan is given in the sections below. 
Analysis of the Industrial Development Plans Macro Forecasts 
In terms of specific forecasts, the average annual rate of growth in 
GDP for the first years of the Lopez Portillo administration (1977-79) 
was forecast by the plan to be 7.5 percent, and having reached 10.6 
( 1) E. V. K. FITZGERALD, «Oil and Mexico's Industrial Development Plan», Texas 
Business Review (May•June 1980), p. 133; see also James STREET, «Prospects for Mexico's 
Industrial Development Plan in the 1980s », Texas Business Review (May-June 1980), 
pp. 125-132, and Victor URQUIDI, «Not by Oil Alone: The Outlook for Mexico», 
Current History (February 1982), pp. 28-81. 
( 2) One· might also argue that the overall orientation of the government has been 
to emphasize industry to the neglect of agriculture. See, Sam LANFRANCO, « Mexican Oil 
Export-led Development and Agricultural Neglect», Journal of Economic Deve/Opment 
(1981), pp. 125-151, for an articulation of this viC"W. 
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percent in 1982, it was expected to stay about that level until 1990 and 
into the 1990s. What is implied by the plan, therefore, is a gradual acce-
leration and then leveling off in the country's growth profile. The higher 
rate of growth from the mid-1980s on is possible notwithstanding the 
precipitous decline forecast by the plan in the growth of the petroleum 
and the petrochemical group in 1982 after which it will remain relatively 
constant until 1990 with the production of crude oil on its platform of 
2.25 million barrels a day (or possibly higher). 
Investment Requirements 
High rates of investment are clearly the link to increases in real 
GDP counted on by the plan. Total investment in 1975 pesos comes to 
243 billion in 1978, up to 291 billion in 1980, on to 357 billion in 1982, 
510 billion in 1985, and finally 634 billion in 1990, for a total increase 
of 161 percent. The average annual increase in 1978-80 is 9.9 percent and 
in 1980-82, it is 11.3 percent. In the next three years, 1982-85, it is 
14.3 percent, while from 1985-90 it averages 4.5 percent. From 1978 to 
1990, therefore, the average annual rate of real investments is 8.3 
percent. How growth in GDP is to be sustained while the rate of increase 
in real investment falls is not spelled out by the plan. Nor is it clear how 
the overall rates of GDP can be achieved with the rates of investment 
proposed by the plan. 
It should be noted that during the 1971-79 period, Mexican GNP 
increased at 5 .4 percent per annum on average in real terms while fixed 
investment expanded at 7 .0 percent per annum. During the 1960s growth 
was higher but the rate of expansion of fixed investment moved ahead 
proportionately more rapidly. In the peak growth years of 1963, 1964, 
1972, 1978, and 1979, the GDP growth exceeded 7 percent. The rate of 
growth in mixed investment ran ahead at between 15 and 20 percent. 
The same reservations apply to the initial period; i.e., the growth 
rates averaging 10 .3 percent per annum anticipated by the mid-1980s 
were expected to be produced as a result of average real increases in 
fixed capital formation of as little as 12.2 percent. 
Based on historical experiences in ·Mexico and in other countries, 
it would appear that an acceleration in the annual rate of increase of fixed 
investment to 12.2 percent would merely raise growth onto a plateau of 
6.5 to 7 .5 percent. By contrast moving GDP growth ahead to a steady 
rate of 10 percent per annum or more would appear to require a sustained 
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rate of increase in fixed investment volume in excess of 20 pen:ent per 
annum. 
The most rapid increase in federal government investment foreseen 
in the plan is over the 1980-1982 period, with a rise of 100 percent. 
While in that period private investment increases more moderately by 
55.6 percent, it is still a high rate. During that period private investment 
under the plan is much more above the base than is federal government 
investment. After 1982 until 1990, the opposite trend occurs, the diffe-
rential over the base rising in the federal government investment from 
17 .6 percent to 65 .2 percent, while falling m the private sector from 
45.8 percent to 20.3 percent. 
Investment by the federal government is anticipated by the plan 
to increase continually to 1990, while in the private sector it is expected 
to decline from the annual peak of 14.0 percent in 1982 and from the 
quinquennial average peak of 12 .6 percent in 1980-85 to an annual 
average of 8.9 percent over the last five years of the plan. 
The rate of increase in investment by the public enterprises reaches 
a peak of 15.3 percent in 1980 when production of PEMEX reaches its 
«platform» of 2.25 million barrels a day. This decline is very steep 
indeed in 1981 (to 1.6 percent from the 15.3 percent in 1980), and 
thereafter the next two five-year periods show an average rate of growth 
less than a quarter of that by the federal government and about one-half 
that by the private sector. 
Financing the Plan 
In terms of the financing of investment, the plan forecasts that the 
proportion contributed by domestic savings grows steadily until 1981 when 
it is 101 percent (because foreign savings make a negative contribution 
indicating that foreign debt is being repaid). Thereafter domestic savings 
decline and foreign savings increase until they reach 5 .0 percent of the 
total in 1990. These projections indicate that policy makers never really 
took seriously the popularly expressed view that increased petroleum 
resources will make Mexico a capital exporting country in the foreseeable 
future. 
Unfortunately, fiscal reform in Mexico has been largely postponed, 
if not abandoned, in favor of selected improvements in the tax rate 
structure and in the administration, budgeting and tax collecting procedures, 
including the coordination of federal, state and local systems. Until 1982 at 
least, petroleum revenues have tended to stiffle any sense of urgency in 
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developing a modern, efficient tax system. The short fall in hydrocarbon 
revenues in 1982 has however, prompted a number of fiscal reforms and 
modifications of the tax system. As of January 1, 1980, Mexico had 
substituted a value-added tax (VAT) for its old tax on gross business 
receipts (impuesto sobre ingressos mercantiles) and for seventeen other 
indirect taxes on specific commodities and services (3). 
The VAT is an improvement of sorts since this tax avoided the 
cascade effect of multiple taxing which is characteristic of the gross 
receipts tax, and the VAT may be rebated to exporters even under the rule 
of the GATT. But the value-added tax has created considerable confusion 
among consumers and small businessmen in Mexico since computation of 
taxable value-added requires considerably more sophisticated book-keeping 
than did the simpler flat rate tax on gross sales receipts. Moreover, VAT 
hurts in the same way that the gross receipts tax hurts; it must be paid 
by every business firm whether the firm sustains profit or loss. Small 
businesses everywhere have opposed the VAT because it is not based 
on the ability to pay; they much prefer a tax on business profits. The 
VAT hurts most- as did the gross receipts tax - those very sectors of 
the economy which the Mexican government says it wants to help: labor 
intensive, small firms in industry, construction and the service,. trades. 
The VAT, whatever its name, is however still a sales tax with a regressive 
impact. Large oligopoly firms can shift it forward to consumers in the 
form of higher prices; all firms will try to shift it backward to labor in 
lower wages; small competitive firms may not be able to shift it at all. 
The VAT in Mexico states a uniform rate of 10 percent (except for the 
border areas and free zones where a preferential 6 percent will prevail), 
and it is estimated not to collect any larger share of the GDP than the 
taxes which it replaces. But neither does it ameliorate any of the adverse 
effects of those indirect taxes on Mexicans of low incomes (4). 
In short, despite the Mexican government's commitment to capital 
formation, as the major source of national income g'rowth, no significant 
improvements were or have been made in the methods of :financing public 
expenditure (other thari of course indirectly through investment in the 
oil sector). Given that current expenditures have historically outrun 
(3) As documented in John EVANS, «The Evolution. of the Mexican Tax System 
During the 1970s », Paper presented at the Southern Economic Association Meetings, 
Washington, D.C., November 5, 1980. 
( 4) Calvin P. BLAIR, «Economic Development Policy in Mexico: A New Penchant 
for Planning», Technical Papers Series No. 26, Office for Public Sector Studies, Institute 
of Latin American Studies, the University of Texas at Austin (1980), p. 15. 
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revenues, there is little reason to· believe this pattern will be broken 
by the plan. Furthermore, given its emphasis on development and employ-
ment, the government has little choice but to maintain aggregate demand 
with the sharp increases in the deficit likely at times resulting in rapid 
expansion in the money supply and inflationary pressures. The social 
costs of slower growth or of recession would include an increase in political 
unrest, more violence, increased illegal· migration to the United States, 
and more land invasions by campesinos without employment alternatives. 
Monetary policy measures in Mexico have largely reflected · the 
needs for :financing the federal deficit. The Mexican authorities have 
allowed rapid growth in the money supply in all but a few of the recent 
years - averaging around 3 3 percent per annum in 1979, 80 and 81. 
Mexican money markets have also grown more integrated with world 
money markets; the authorities have recently created a treasury certificate 
which can be used in open market operations, and they will move 
slowly toward the use of general quantitative credit controls, gradually 
giving up the elaborate quantitative system of direct credit and managed 
interest rates which characterize Mexico's monetary policy. When petro-
leum exports receive from the 1982-83 downturn, they may create future 
inflationary pressures as foreign exchange is sold for pesos to commercial 
banks and to the central bank of Mexico (5). 
External Balance 
The external accounts over the plan period should reflect the 
changes that are anticipated to occur in the domestic economy. In thls 
regard it is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that the petrole\.lm 
industry and the surplus that it is yielding are the key elements of the 
plan, and the further fact that the production and exportation of petro-
leum and petrochemicals are identical in the base and the plan projections, 
enormous differences do exist, however, between the plan and base in 
the various items that make up the balance of payments. 
The greatest difference between plan and base (the plan differential) 
exists in the current account balance, which shows a deficit in 1990 of 
-$26.4 billion in the plan and a surplus of $4.6 billion in the base. The 
plan differential is also large in 1982, when both the plan and the base 
. 
(&) Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
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show a surplus, although under the plan it is about to turn into a deficit (6). 
The differential in factor payments is zero or small through 1982, but 
by 1990 it is very large. Total receipts from capital and labor are identical 
in the base and in the plan. The chief items in receipts are interest and 
remittances, and in the 12 years to 1990 the former increases more than 
five times while the latter quadruples. The plan differential of 230 percent 
must obviously be entirely due to payments abroad. And within payments 
abroad, the differential is caused entirely by payments of interest on 
public debt. In fact these payments are ten times the amount forecast 
for the base while for the same time period, foreign direct investment 
is forecast as identical in the plan and the base. 
The large plan differential in the importation of goods reflects the 
intention to borrow more abroad. Presumably, the foreign borrowing 
base increased identically in the two projections, insofar as it depends 
on the oil surplus. It makes little sense, therefore, to forecast such dif-
ferent volumes of borrowing in the base and plan forecasts. The plausi-
bility of these forecasts is all the less because past policy on which the 
base projection is founded is accused of having borrowed abroad too much. 
It is, therefore, somewhat inconsistent to project that it will borrow too 
little in the plan period. 
In terms of exports of hydrocarbons, the production and export of 
crude petroleum and derived products is projected identically for the 
base and the plan. This is another apparent inconsistency; i.e., that the 
exports of petrochemicals will be identical in view of the large plan 
differentials in other important respects. For example, the plan differential 
for total goods exported is 3 8. 7 percent in 1990. It is negligible until 
1982, and then it becomes only 2.6 percent. In the plan petroleum and 
petrochemicals exports will have risen to 61.0 percent of total exports of 
goods by 1982 (from 34.4 percent in 1978), after which they will fall to 
nearly 40 percent in 1990. In contrast, they will fall to only 51.2 percent 
of the total in the base forecast. This difference between the base and the 
plan is, of course, entirely the result of the much greater increase of non-
petroleum exports under the plan. It would seem, however, that exports 
of this magnitude will ultimately depend on American policy towards 
Mexican imports, and it is by no means clear given the growing sentiment 
of protectionism in the United States that accommodations anywhere near 
these levels will be made. 
(6) These patterns are common to oil exporters. See Alan GELB, «Capital-Importing 
Oil Exporters: Adjustment Issues and Policy Choices»; World Bank Working Paper No. 475 
(August 1981) for a comparison of Mexico and other developing country oil exporters. 
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Role of the Government 
As noted earlier, the government is to play a more active part in 
directing the economy. This is readily apparent by comparison of the levels 
of public sector expenditures in the plan and base forecasts. Available 
resources consist of gross domestic product plus imports. Resources are 
used by intermediate demand which consists of industrial inputs, private 
consumption of final products, government consumption, fixed capital in-
vestment, allocations to inventories and exports {7). 
Clearly, under the plan an effort was being made at least up to 
1982 to increase investment rather than consumption. The share of 
intermediate demand (industrial inputs) diminished, but it was accompanied 
by the biggest proportional change (66.7 percent) in the share of addition 
to inventories. Presumably, the plan anticipates industry will be stocking 
up in view of the high rate of fixed investment to be achieved during the 
1982-1990 period (increasing its share to 16.5 percent as compared with 
11.6 percent in 1978-1982). This is the only category that declines con-
tinuously (from 44.1 percent of resources in 1975 to 39.1 percent in 
1990). The share of government consumption is to be constant until 1982, 
but then is forecast to increase by a larger percentage than any other 
category over the 1982-1990 period. Then the share of exports are forecast 
to decline heavily after 1982 because exports of petroleum products and 
petrochemicals are held at their platform rates. 
Oil Production - Exports 
Mexico's oil industry had begun to show signs of slowing down in 
the 1960s. In mid-1973 a group of international petroleum experts esti-
mated that Mexican imports of petroleum products would have to rise 
from 100,000 bpd to 4.5 million bpd by the end of the century. Assuming 
that the price of crude would triple to $9 a barrel (a pre-1973 estimate), 
the cost of imports would be about $15 billion a year. The dramatic 
nature of the improvement resulting from the new finds is indicated by 
the fact that the National Plan for Industrial Development estimated 
(7) Calvin BLAIR, « Mexico's Economic Development and Relations with the United 
States», Texas Business Review (March-April 1979), p. 41. See also Stanley Ross, «Key 
fssues in Mexican-United States Relations», Texas Business Review (March-April, 1979), 
pp. 51-53, and Richard ERB.AND, Stanley Ross, eds., U.S. Policies Toward Mexico 
(Washington: American Enterprise, 1979). 
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that exports of petroleum products would be earning $15 billion in 
foreign exchange by the year 2000. 
While the outlook was made even more favorable by the rise in 
international oil prices after the plan was published, the country's export 
prospects have of course been dimmed considerably by the 1981-82 world-
wide oil glut, and the resultant shortfall of around six billion dollars 
in 1981. 
The effects of the Reforma discoveries in 1972 were not felt im-
mediately as the production of crude increased in 1973 by only 1.9 
percent. But in 197 4 crude production increased by nearly 25 percent 
and except for a drop in 1976 to 11.2 percent, it increased by over 20 
percent in each of the following years through 1978. 
The percentage increase in the gross income of PEMEX has been 
greater than that of production due to the international price increases 
together with a very considerable rise of prices to domestic consumers. 
The production of crude in 1979 was expected to increase by nearly 
28.0 percent and of gas by 29 percent. Refining, however, was to increase 
by less than 5 percent over 1978. Exports of crude petroleum alone in 
1979 were expected to increase by 83 percent over the 1978 combined 
total of crude and refined products. The total number of wells planned to 
be drilled was 409 in 1979, of which 359 were to be on-shore and 50 
off-shore. 
As a result the petroleum sector's contribution to GDP increased 
17.5 percent from 1979-1980, the second highest annual growth registered 
by this sector since 1950. Crude oil, gas liquids, and condensate production 
averaged 2.1 million barrels a day, an increase of 32 percent over 1979. 
In November 1980 Mexico announced a National Energy Plan with 
goals for 1990 and projections for the year 2000. The goals and priorities 
established in the plan are to (8 ): ( 1) export petroleum only insofar as the 
country can productively absorb resources from abroad; (2) attempt to 
increase the value-added content of petroleum exports; (3) use the export 
of petroleum to diversify Mexico's foreign trading partners; (4) take 
advantage of petroleum sales to absorb modern technology, develop more 
rapidly the production of capital goods, obtain access to new markets 
abroad for manufactured goods, and obtain better terms of financing, and 
(5) cooperate with other countries in the development and supply of 
(8) Ministry of National Properties and Industrial Development, Mexico Energy Pro-
gram: «Goals to 1990 and Projections to the Year 2000 », Commercio Exterior de Mexico 
(December 1980), pp. 438-439. 
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petroleum and in the exploitation of local sources of energy. For the 
decades of the 1980s, the plan proposed an export limit of 1.5 million 
barrels per day of petroleum and .300 million cubic feet of gas. In keeping 
with a more general goal to diversify foreign trade, Mexico will try to 
avoid concentrating more than 50 percent of hydrocarbon exports to any 
one country (9). 
Ironically, although oil is supposed to provide an important share 
of the financial resources necessary to fund various projects discussed in 
the industrial development plan, the specific links between oil policy 
and other economic policy objectives have not ·always been specified. When 
they are, there are contradictions associated with the actual implementation 
of policies. More importantly, little has been done in other areas that 
could more ef(ectively help to achieve stated government objectives in 
the Plan (10). Gerardo Bueno, a respected economics Professor from El 
Colegio de Mexico, has been particularly critical of government policy-
making efforts in this area. Bueno has argued that reducing protection 
would make more goods available at lower prices (assuming imported 
products were more competitive than domestic products) helping to curb 
inflation somewhat. And adjusting the exchange rate of the peso closer 
to its true value would be to promote exports by making Mexican goods 
cheaper. Bueno asked the poignant question: «Why formulate plans, why 
approve and sanction them, if in the final analysis the decision making 
process concerning these crucial questions continues as if such plans never 
existed or never were approved» (11). 
Along similar lines, Rene Villarreal, another prominent economist at 
the ministry of Finance in the Lopez Portillo administration has contended 
that even though oil may be instrumental in dealing with some of the 
traditional constraints on economic growth (e.g. availability of foreign 
exchange), the government has not designed ways to deal with other issues 
such as inflation and the public direct. Villarreal analysis indicates that 
public savings should be increased to finance investments from the govern-
ment's own resources and that the economy should be open to greater 
competition in order to force domestic producers to be more efficient and 
(9) Salvatore BIZZARRO, «Mexico's Oil Boom•, Current History (February 1981), p. 50. 
(iO) Daniel LEVY and Gabriel SZEKELY, Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 247. 
(11) Gerardo BUENO, « Petrolco y planes de desarrollo en Mexico•, Commercio 
Exterior (1981), p. 839. 
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to increase their exports (12). Thus Bueno and Villarreal are among those who 
have strongly criticized continued and unqualified pursuit of an import 
substitution industrialization strategy. It should be recalled that emphasis 
on producing certain goods for export is an alternative strategy to import 
substitution strategy and that opening the economy to greater competition 
does not necessarily mean that Mexico must become a member of Gatt. The 
point is that government plans do not deal explicity and at the same level 
of analysis with all issues - issues that are critical for revitalizing the 
country's over-all economic growth path. 
Future Supplies of Petroleum Products 
In October 1977, PEMEX presented its official forecast to 1982 of 
production of oil and gas, domestic consumption on availabilities for 
export of gas and the total investment that would be necessary to achieve 
the predicted production. At the time it was assumed the August 1977 
agreement with the private U. S. gas distributors wpuld be soon con-
summated (13). 
The original estimates of gas available for export have been affected 
by the decision to convert Mexican industry to gas. It will take a con-
siderable amount of time, however, before the effects of the conversion 
will affect domestic consumption of natural gas (and therefore how big 
the surplus available for export will be). Similar uncertainties affect the 
estimates of U.S. future demand for foreign gas. The proposed two billion 
cubic feet a day of gas through Reynosa would represent only about 4 
percent of U.S. current consumption. Some experts believe, however, 
that the existing Mexican reserves of natural gas would justify the 
production of as much as 14 billion cubic feet a day, and that quantity 
would leave mµch more for export (14). 
It should be noted that past efforts to forecast hydrocarbon production 
have encountered a wide margin of error. For example, estimates of 954,000 
bpd for crude production in 1977 was in fact exceeded by about 13 7 ,000 
bpd while that for 197 8 was deficient by about 110 ,000 bpd. The estimate 
for 1979 was also about 131,500 above the latter estimate of 6~0 million 
(l~) Rene VILLARREAL, «Petroleum and Mexican Economic Growth and Development 
in the 1980s », in Jerry R. LADMAN, ed., U.S.-Mexican Energy Relationships: Realities 
and Prospects (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1981), pp. 69-86. 
(13) Cfr. George CRAYSON, The Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1980), Ch. 7 for an excellent account of the U.S.-Mexican gas negotiations. 
(l') Ibid. See also George GRAYSON, «Oil and .Politics in Mexico», Current History 
(November 1981), pp. 379-383. 
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barrels for that year (or 1,700,00 bpd). The 1977 forecast envisaged that 
in 1982 production would be 2.7 million bpd instead of the production 
platform of 2.25 million bpd, which was subsequently reached in 1980, 
two years earlier. 
The Plan Nacional published its estimates of the value in constant 
1975 pesos during 1978-90 of production and exports of petroleum pro-
ducts and petrochemicals. These estimates were based on the assumption 
that the price of crude oil would increase by 6.6 percent annually until 
1982, and 5 percent annually thereafter. The annual rates of increase are 
greater for the combined item than for crude alone, except in 1978 when 
the increase for crude alone is 50.4 percent as against 26.3 percent for 
the combined item. The actual figure for crude in 1978 was an increase 
of 22.5 percent- a considerable difference. In 1978 the increase in exports 
of the combined items were anticipated to be at a maximum, declining 
very rapidly in 1980, when the production and the export of crude are to 
reach their platform. The increase in exports was forecast to be zero in 
1990. At that time the ratio of exports to production was expected to be 
at its minimum. 
The Petroleum Surplus 
The exports of crude, refined products and petrochemicals constitute 
the « financial surplus from petroleum ». This is defined in the plan « in 
the broad sense, as the additional spending power that hydrocarbon exports 
give the economy». The concept is said «not to be limited .to the extra 
tax revenue the oil surplus brings to the public treasury, nor the additional 
receipts that it brings to the balance of payments. Having larger external 
resources at its disposal, the economy can generate more internal resources. 
The sum of both is the correct measure to the surplus». This is only 
partially correct, since both the magnitude and time profile of the surplus 
are critically dependent on the manner in which the surplus is utilized 
in the government's budget (15). 
In measuring the financial oil surplus, account must be taken not 
only of the additional exports and the savings on imports of petroleum 
products, but also in the increase in foreign borrowing power that is 
associated with the expanded level of petroleum production. The report 
(15) An interesting radical critique of the surplus and government corruption is given 
in Jim CocKCROFT and Ross GANDY, «The Mexican Volcano,., Monthly Review (May 1981), 
pp. 32-44. 
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does not give specific recognition to this fact. Yet this increase in foreign 
borrowing potential has allowed the country to draw more extensively 
on foreign savings and thus pushed still farther into the future the 
balance of payments constraint. 
The balance of payments projections in the National Plan forecast 
a modest current account surplus of $4 77 million in 1981, dropping to 
$26·million in 1982, before going increasingly into deficit reaching -·$5.3 
billion in 1935 and -$26.4 billion in 1990. Petroleum exports are 
estimated to be $7.4 billion in 1981, $8.4 billion in 1982, and rising to 
$12.5 billion in 1990. The petroleum exports thus are looked upon as 
keeping the current deficit low enough to be easily financed by foreign 
loans. Exports of manufactured products are estimated to grow from 
$2.4 billion in 1979 to $3.6 billion in 1982, and to reach $16.6 billion 
in 1990. Manufactured exports were thus obviously expected to play an 
important role in keeping the foreign account deficit down to financial 
proportions. 
Regrettably instead of using its mounting oil revenue to build up a 
strong and labor-intensive non-oil exporting industry, the Government 
used the money to support an overvalued peso and thereby encouraged 
massive outflows of capital, accelerated imports of luxury items, kept 
domestic industry heavily protected and in effect mortgaged the country 
through. excessive foreign borrowings (18). 
By 1983 the De la Madrid Administration while battling an acute 
liquidity crisis set a target of quadrupling its annual non-oil exports to 
$20 billion by 1988. Senior trade officials say the target is a matter of 
economic survival. If it is not achieved the country faces the grim prospect 
of an even higher and permanent" level of unemployment- at present 
(1983) only three of five Mexicans have full time jobs. 
The ·new Government of President Miguel de la Madrid seems 
determined to learn from Mexico's mistake and to use the crisis to make 
the economy export oriented once and for all. The peso is now deliberately 
undervalued to make exports competitive and the country a bargain for 
tourists. The currency fell against the dollar by 82 percent in 1982. 
The level of protectionism will also be gradually reduced to force 
companies to be more efficient. As of early 1983 almost 100 percent of 
imports are under the licensing system because of exchange controls. 
(18) Cf. William CHIS LETT, « Mexico Pins its Hopes on Non-Oil Exports », ·Financial 
Times (March 21, 1983), p. 4; Alan RIDING, «Mexico's Road to Trouble is Coated with 
Oil~. New York Times (February 21, 1982), p. E3; and William CHISLETT, «Mexico's 
Gung-ho Businessmen Feel the Pinch», Financial Times (March 8, 1983 ), p. 5. 
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There are however, a number of problems which are hindering 
non-oil exports. 
First, the private sector which accounts for the bulk of these exports 
says that the dual exchange rate system with a controlled rate currently 
(March 1983) at 107 pesos per dollar and a free rate at almost 150 pesos 
is a deterrent to exporting. Businessmen are having to buy their dollars 
for imports mainly at the free rate, even for those imports of essential 
goods which fall within the more favorable controlled rate category. This 
is because of the dire shortage of dollars in Mexico. Export earning also 
have to be changed in the state dunking system at the controlled and not 
the free rate. 
Second, as Mexico rejected GATT membership and also has not 
signed the latest GATT code of conduct on subsidies and countervailing 
duties, the U.S. does not have to prove economic damage-which is 
hard to do before imposing duties. Duties have been imposed on Mexican 
leather goods, ceramic tiles and toy balloons and the two countries are in 
dispute over shipments of Mexican beer into the U.S. 
Mexico has cancelled its programme of tax rebates for exporters and 
also is going to raise the subsidised rates of interest on its export credits. 
But the new. government is reluctant to commit itself in any way to 
signing the GATT subsidies code which it would have to consider doing 
as part of its trade agreement with the U.S. 
Plan Performance 
Clearly economic events in Mexico have not unfolded as anticipated 
by the industrial plan. Several manifestations of the failure of the country's 
growth strategy have been alluded to above. As the following sections 
attempt to document the failure of government policy in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s can be ultimately traced to an extreme sense of over optimism 
on the part of the Lopez Portillo administration concerning the trend in oil 
revenues and the ability of the government's leading technocrates to 
manage a disequilibrium system characterized by an over valued peso 
and severe price distortions throughout the economy. 
The Lopez Portillo administration had· anticipated that the 1977-82 
period would be broken down into three distinct phases and the first 
two years would be a period of «stabilization and inflation control». This 
was ·to be followed by a period of « consolidation » of stability in 1979 and 
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1980 and finally by a period of accelerated growth in 1981 and 1982 (17). 
The administration therefore planned to undertake an economic program 
in stages, in which the goals of internal and external stability would be 
gradually replaced by other longer term goals such as growth and employ-
ment. It was intended first to stabilize the economy and then to promote 
its growth, but always within a framework of low inflation and external 
stability. Growth would be achieved through the expansion of domestic 
demand, and stability through an increase in the supply of goods and 
services, strongly supplemented by imports. This program would be 
underpinned by the accelerated exploitation and development of oil 
resources. Financing was to come from the export earnings of oil and gas, 
supplemented whenever necessary by Mexico's ready access to the 
international financial markets. 
The economic policy instruments called upon to play an important 
role were public expenditure and exchange policy (18). In 1981 public 
expenditures as a proportion of GP amounted to about 36 percent 
compared with 29 percent in 1976 and 20 percent in 1970. Just as 
public expenditure was the principal instrument of demand, the exchange 
rate was the most important instrument of monetary and price policy. 
Following the devaluation in 1976 and with effect from 1977 a policy 
of gradual overvaluation of the peso was consciously adopted. This made 
it possible to channel the inflationary pressures of demand towards the 
external sector and hence avoid a higher rate of increase in domestic 
prices. On the costs side, the overvaluation of the peso ensured a supply 
of imported goods at favorable prices and it also reduced cost pressures 
for compensatory increases in wages. Finally, it reduced the cost of 
external credit to enterprises that decided to make it significant use of 
this method of financing their expansion plans. 
While the development and exploitation of oil resources was a 
growth factor, it was also a source of distortions and caused instability. 
Indeed without the stability goals planned for the first period having been 
achieved, the Mexican economy entered upon a stage of rapid and 
sustained growth from the beginning of 1978. In 1981 the fourth con-
(17) For an excellent critique of this strategy see Sidney WEINTRAUB, «Case Study 
of Economic Stabilization: Mexico», in William R. CLINE and Sidney WEINTRAUB, Economic 
Stabilization in Developing Countries (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1981). 
pp. 271-296. 
(1B) A more detailed analysis of this policy is given in Robert E. LOONEY, «The 
Feasibility of Alternative IMF Stabilization Programs for Mexico, 1983-85 », Paper pre-
sented at the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, Boston, March 10-12, 1983. 
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secutive ·year, the economy continued to grow vigorously, but in the 
context of strong inflationary pressures and an increasing external dis-equi-
librium. Real GDP grew by 8.1 percent, while consumer prices, measured 
December to December, increased by about 29 percent in 1981 compared 
with 23 percent in 1976. 
This increase in productive capacity was especially marked in some 
industrial sector, where it was accompanied by significant increase in output. 
This applies to the manufacture on non-electrical machinery and equipment 
and the production of cement and fertilizers. The long lead time of 
investments in other sectors, such as electric energy generation and basiC 
metal industries has delayed their production increases, however. 
The distortions and disequilibrium associated with this growth strategy 
were primarily concentrated in the external sector {19). Indeed whereas 
exports rose by 9 percent annually in real terms in 1978-81 (6.7 percent 
in 1971-76), imports grew by 24 percent annually, four times higher 
than in 1971-76. The significant openness of the economy was accom-
panied by a notable concentration of. exports. This was due, on the one 
hand, to the rapid growth of crude and gas exports and, on the other, 
to the virtual stagnation of other merchandise exports. Indeed, whereas 
exports of crude increased more than five fold, exports of manufacturers 
increased at an average annual rate of only 2.2 percent in the same period 
and in 1981 they fell by 10 percent. This unfavorable performance was due 
in part to the increase in domestic demand, but mainly to the overvaluation 
of the peso which reduced competitiveness in the international market. The 
relative share of hydrocarbon exports rose from approximately 21 percent 
in 1977 to 71 percent in 1981, whereas that of manufactures fell from 46 
percent to 17 percent. 
Furthermore, efforts to cushion the inflationary impact of this acce-
lerated growth policy, though the exchange policy and the opening up of 
the economy to the external market, were only relatively successful. In 
1981 for the second consecutive year, the inflatiOft-i'ate·· was slightly less 
than 30 percent annually while efforts to reduce it significantly were 
unsuccessful. The high inflation rate, approximately three times higher 
than the world inflation rate, led to a gradual overvaluation of the 
peso which was only partially eased by mini adjustments in 1980 and 1981. 
Efforts to keep the exchange rate under control forced the monetary autho-
rities to make increasing use of interest rates to strengthen the balance of 
(19) William R. CLINE, «Mexico's Crisis: The World;s Peril i., Foreign Policy (Winter 
1982-83), pp. 108-109. 
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payments and support the peso. In December 1981 the normal interest 
rate on time deposits (90-179) days dominated in pesos was approximately 
32 percent, that is 19 percentage points higher than the London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR) (20). 
The vulnerability of this growth policy is shown by the fact that in 
1981 approximately 15 percent of the available goods were :financed with 
external inflow, 70 percent of which were generated by exports of a single 
commodity. 
In February 1982, the Bank of Mexico withdrew from the dollar 
market and the peso floated freely. There was an immediate 30 percent 
depreciation of the currency followed by another 18 percent devaluation 
in May 1982. At the same time, the government instituted a program of 
«self-discipline» styled after IMF programs. The program did not, 
however, involve the IMF. Some of the measures enacted included: a 
reduction of the deficit/GNP ratio, price controls on certain basic and 
industrial products, limits on public and private sector imports, and 
nationalization of banks in September 1982. 
While well structured, the program was by and large unsuccessful, 
especially in the key area of public finance since the government was 
unwilling to reduce expenditures and limit credit expansion. Unable to 
raise enough capital in financial markets, the government approached the 
IMF in the summer of 1982 for a major loan. 
On November 10, 1982, a letter of intent was signed by the IMF 
and Mexico. While only a first step in a final IMF loan package, the 
letter outlined a three year economic adjustment program for Mexico. 
The main thrust of the letter was to reduce the size of the deficit. Speci-
fically the letter called for deficit to GNP ratios of 8 .5, 5 .5 and 3 .5 
percent in 1983, 1984, 5 and 1985-87, respectively, which implies major 
public expenditure cuts. The country made a specific commitment that 
the debt, now at approximately $60 billion, would not increase by more 
than $5 billion in 1983. The Mexican government initially rejected the 
Fund's proposal to remove exchange controls, eliminate the three tier 
exchange rate system, or raise domestic interest rates. However, the 
government has now agreed to a compromise on each point. Incremental 
movements towards the Fund's position will be implemented over time. 
At present (early 1983) there is widespread concern in Mexico, 
especially among politicians, that the policies embodied in the letter of 
(20) INTER AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, Econ<Jmic and Progress in Latin America, 
1982 Report (Washington: IBRD, 1982), p. 285. 
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intent could lead, in the context of an inflation rate of around 100%, 
to negative growth rates over the 1983-84 period. 
Conclusions 
Historically, two extreme paradigms of national economic policy 
have been used to characterize the experience of Latin American countries. 
One is a « nationalist-structuralist » regime in which high rates of domestic 
production of domestic industry, for purposes of import-substitution, 
exchange controls, severe restrictions on foreign direct investment and 
profit remittances, and a general discouragement of the export sector 
predominate. The· other is a more «orthodox» open economy strategy 
following the pattern of international comparative advantage, foreign 
investment, free convertibility, flexible exchange rates, encouragement 
of financial intermediation and international credit flows and with attempts 
to maintain a wage structure competitive with the most vigorous inter-
national trading partners. 
In large part, Mexico has followed its own ad hoc policies which 
reflect neither extreme. For this reason it has been difficult for observers 
to pinpoint exactly what the economic regime of Mexico is or is likely 
to be; the government engages in nationalist rhetoric but maintains rela-
tively cordial relationships with foreign investors. Indeed in the last 
few years there has been an unprecedented inflow of foreign direct in-
vestment much of it in the direction of « production-sharing » with the 
U.S. market through maquiladoras and plants which also serve the Mexican 
market. The principle of comparative advantage has been pursued in 
this strategy, but at the same time exchange policies ( overvaluation of the 
peso until the recent sharp devaluation) have worked against compara~ive 
advantage by pricing Mexican exports relatively high and imports low. 
Based on the Industrial Development Plan published in 1979, it 
appeared that: 
1. average annual growth rates of 6.5 percent could be maintained 
while raising oil exports to around one million barrels per day by 1982, 
compared with 543,000 barrels per day in 1979. If this were done, it 
was calculated that Mexico would be in a position to reverse its current 
account deficit position in the range of $1.6 to $4.2 billion over the 
period 1975-1979, and to surpluses of the same order in the 1980s; and 
. 
2. alternatively with the same level of oil exports, much higher 
plan trajectories leading to 10.6 percent GDP growth could be maintained, 
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but with deficits reemerging in the period from 1983 onwards, reaching 
$5 billion by 1985 and $26 billion by 1990, both :figures being in current 
prices. 
Other constraints were applied in order to produce these figures. It 
was assumed, for example, that Mexico would be able to expand its external 
borrowing without extending its overall level of indebtedness provided 
that: 
1. the current account deficit should not, in any year, be more than 
two percent of GDP, and 
2. in the mediµm term, net factor payments abroad, including current 
transfers, should represent an average of less than 15 percent of the 
export income from goods and services. 
Observing these limits, the country would obtain without compro-
mising its economic independence, in the opinion of the government, 
external resources sufficient to generate additional internal resources to 
help meet its development objectives. 
However, the logic behind these calculations has been shown to be 
open question on several grounds. Most importantly both the investment 
requirements and inflationary impact of the plan are underestimated. 
Second, changes in the world oil situation to better (1979) then worse 
(1981-82) have altered the expected revenue stream from petroleum 
exports. 
Finally, the Industrial Development Plan is indicative rather than 
compulsory. Much is said about rewards for those willing to cooperate, 
but means for enforcement are lacking. In this respect the Industrial 
Plan is similar to many other planning efforts conducted in the, past, all 
of which were. shelfed after some time without having achieved significant 
results (21 ). These critical comments are intended to caution those who 
hope that oil surpluses and very elaborate plans are adequate to solve the 
complex issues faced by Mexico's development model. The events of 
1981-1982 seem to confirm the more cautious view. 
(21) Daniel LEVY and Gabriel SZEKELY, Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983), p. 253-254. 
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L'OTTIMISMO MESSICANO E LA REALTA' DELL'ECONOMIA: 
UN'ANALISI DEL PIANO DI SVILUPPO INDUSTRIALE MESSI-
CANO 
Sulla base del piano di sviluppo industriale messicano pubblicato nel 1979, 
risulta quanta segue. In primo luogo, si prevede possibile raggiungere un tasso 
media annuo di sviluppo di lungo periodo del 6,5% in termini reali, accrescendo 
nel contempo l'esportazione di petrolio a un milione di barili al giorno dal 
1982, rispetto ai 543 mila del 1979. In tale ipotesi, si calcola che ii Messico 
sarebbe in condizione di rovesciare la sua situazione di deficit di parte corrente 
(dell'ordine di 1,6-4,2 miliardi di dollari per ii periodo 1975-79) realizzando 
un avanzo del medesimo ordine di grandezza per gli anni Ottanta. In secondo 
luogo, viene calcolato che, col medesimo ammontare di esportazioni petrolifere, 
sarebbe possibile una traiettoria di crescita assai piu rapida, con tassi annui 
di crescita reale attorno al 10%: in tal caso, tuttavia, riemergerebbe un disavanzo 
di parte corrente nella bilancia dei pagamenti dopo 1'83, fino a raggiungere i 
26 miliardi di dollari a valori correnti nel 1990. 
Altri risultati e vincoli adottati nella formulazione del piano indicano 
condizioni capaci di assicurare credito dall'estero al paese senza accrescerne 
l'indebitamento globale. Cio e quanta puo accadere, purche ii disavanzo di 
parte Corrente venga contenuto entro ii limite del 2% del PIL e le rimesse 
e redditi netti dei fattori all'estero, inclusi i trasferimenti correnti, non 
rappresentino a media termine (in media ) piu del 15 % del flusso di esporta-
zioni di beni e servizi. Di tal natura appaiono dunque essere i limiti, nell'opinione 
dei programmatori, capaci di garantire adeguato sviluppo al paese senza 
comprometterne l'indipendenza economics. 
Tuttavia queste stime sono criticabili sotto diversi profili. I maggiori 
riguardano la sottovalutazione del fabbisogno d'investimenti e dei pericoli di 
tensioni inflazionistiche. Inoltre le valutazioni sugli introiti da esportazione 
di petrolio appaiono influenza ti dalle prospettive quali apparivano al 1979, tali 
da indurre maggiore ottimismo di quanta oggi paia giustifi.cato. Un'altra serie 
di rilievi critici riguarda carenze negli strumenti legislativi e negli incentivi 
che dovrebbero assicurare la realizzabilita del piano stesso. Anche ii compor-
tamento recente del sistema sembra suggerire una certa cautela nel valutare 
le capacita di sviluppo del paese. 
